

*Consider etc  
Navy*

25 July 1951

## MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting with IAC Representatives of Project Bluebird

PRESENT: Dr. [REDACTED], CIA

Approved for Release

Mr. J. H. Alberti, Navy Designee  
 Lt. Cdr. Hardenburg, Navy Alternate  
 Col. Lloyd E. Gould, Air Force Designee  
 Lt. Col. William H. Saunders, Army Designee

*Jan 1953*

1. Dr. [REDACTED] reviewed the development of the Project within CIA. This program was undertaken because it became evident that some measures must be taken to provide protection for our personnel against Soviet interrogation techniques. Recommendations were made to Mr. Dulles, therefore, that a high priority program be established on this subject. The program was accepted by Mr. Dulles and approved by the DCI. At an executive session at the IAC on 2 April 1951, the program was explained to the heads of the other intelligence agencies and they were requested to nominate designees to work with the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence on the matter. Each one of the designees has been approached informally to determine his department's interests and programs existent. A final step in this process was the memorandum to each designee asking for the specific objectives of his department and for information on established or planned programs. The date of 20 July for submission of this information was established because of a meeting of consultants to the project scheduled for 23 July 1951.

2. Mr. Alberti outlined in detail the Navy program and his concept of the over-all objectives:

a. Defensive aspects - An example of the action taken by the Navy in this regard is a briefing which Mr. Alberti gives to CIA personnel which consists primarily of indoctrination or conditioning.

b. Offensive aspects - These break down into:

(1) The use of drugs, etc.

(2) Interrogation techniques:

(a) Mechanical aids

(b) Pharmaceuticals

The current Navy research effort started in 1947 at Bethesda. The Army and the Air Force were advised of this effort which proceeded rather slowly due to limitations in funds, etc. The next significant



developed. It occurred at about the same time when in 1950 about a year ago:

a. CIA ~~approached~~ approached Mr. Alberti for support in connection with Project Bluebird (in this connection Mr. Alberti suggested that the code name for the CIA Project be changed since "Bluebird" referred to a specific operation which is now completed.) Col. Edwards's project consisted primarily of the use of narco-hypnosis plus mechanical aids such as the lie detector. The CIA Project did not use some of the drugs offered by the Navy and the opportunity for testing these in that project was therefore lost.

b. At about the same time the Navy re-analyzed the Department of Defense projects concerned with obtaining intelligence from interrogations and decided that there were limitations on capabilities within the Department of Defense due to the difficulty of conducting tests on individuals, etc. The Navy took the matter up with Admiral Brown who was associated with Dr. Keeling in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and who knew of the Navy interest because of his previous position as Director of Research, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. At that time also, the Navy ~~was~~ who was working on "motion sickness" problems. A project was established under ONR with ~~ONR~~ with ~~ONR~~ allocated by OSD over a period of three years. ONR to date has expended \$50,000 for which they will ultimately be reimbursed by the Office of Secretary of Defense. The Army and Air Force were briefed on this project. Also joint meetings were held with CIA and the FBI, but not the Department of State. The FBI's reaction was - no interest - nothing to contribute - could not admit interest in such a project anyway.

c. Also at the same time, ONR advised ONI of the ~~ONR~~ Project at the University of Indiana. This project is in essence a search for valid indications of deception other than the mechanical indicators now being used. It also considered certain other known mechanical indicators such as eye motions, etc. This project is now financed - Navy \$50,000 - Army and Air Force \$25,000 each.

In summary, Mr. Alberti stated that the specific objectives of these projects are the development of offensive techniques. They are coordinated Department of Defense projects under the management control of ONR. All information on such projects will be made available to CIA. The Navy also has an intense interest in developing new techniques for resistance to interrogation (the defensive aspects).

3. The Air Force member advised that he would be forced to give a negative report on activities in his department until further information could be obtained.

4. The Army member advised that he was in about the same position except that he had learned of a project at Harvard University under



Dr. [redacted] believes that [redacted] in the psychiatric field, is unclassified, and was developed and is controlled by the Office of the Surgeon General of the Army.

5. Dr. [redacted] explained the mission of the medical unit in OSI. It is responsible for continued surveillance of foreign efforts in this field but is not briefed and has no responsibility for this project as such. He is handling everything under his personal direction with all individuals in CIA listed as to knowledge, etc.

6. The service members brought up the subject of manuals now in preparation in the Joint Chiefs of Staff to serve as guidance as to the attitude to be adopted by members of the Armed Services when captured. There is a series of JCS papers (classification TOP SECRET) which when approved will be submitted through the DCI to the National Security Council. When finally approved these will result in unclassified directives and manuals for the guidance of all service personnel. The primary purpose is to advise service personnel on:

- a. How to avoid disclosing information when captured.
- b. How to avoid beatings or other Soviet techniques because they are suspected of having such information. This is mainly a part of the defensive or resistance aspect.

7. Mr. Alberti agreed to advise Dr. [redacted] when the JCS papers (JCS 2053) are ready for transmittal to the DCI.

8. Mr. Chadwell then described the program within CIA. There is an internal working group composed of representatives from the interested offices:

- a. [redacted]
- b. Mr. [redacted]
- c. [redacted]
- d. [redacted]
- e. [redacted]
- f. Dr. [redacted]
- g. [redacted]
- h. [redacted]

These individuals meet regularly to insure continuing progress and full coordination with respect to each aspect of the project in which one or more components of CIA have an interest. The information on the existence of the project is limited to a few individuals in each of the interested offices and this list is on record here.

[redacted]



9. In addition, CIA has an outside working group composed of competent scientists as follows:

b. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

d. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

This is a group which will be briefed on 23 July at which time it is hoped to convince them that the project is worthy of their attention and as much of their time as they can spare from their other responsibilities. It is hoped that we can stimulate their thinking and obtain some constructive suggestions as to specific approaches to the various research aspects of the project. In this connection, there will be experimental programs which can be carried out in this country. There will also be programs which cannot be done here and may take the form of the original project Bluebird. The results of the latter type of experiment will probably be reported in two ways:

a. Substantive reports on the detailed information obtained from the individual. These are not our concern and will be issued through regular established intelligence channels.

b. Technical reports - These are reports which would be made by technical observers on the reactions of the subject with respect to the techniques used and would come back for review by the best scientific competence available. This would then suggest new approaches and generate further experimentation. Mr. Alberti noted the difficulty which arose in connection with original Project Bluebird and asked that adequate notice of new CIA operations for research purposes in this field be given to the service representatives.

10. The subject of collation of information which is known to be available in great quantities on the techniques used on individuals who have been in the hands of the Soviets was considered. Mr. Alberti noted that this breaks down into two main categories:

a. Information on interrogation of captured persons for the purpose of obtaining intelligence. There is practically no information available on the techniques used in this connection.

b. Information on interrogations to obtain confessions. There is known to be mountains of information on this subject all of which has been collated by interested officials in the Department of Defense although no summary has been prepared and it is not believed that such a summary is necessary.

11. It was agreed that it would be constructive to bring together the service designees and the CIA consultant panel at an early date. It would



possibly Captain Kellum together with this group.

12. A suggestion was made that since we will eventually meet the problem of obtaining funds for research from the various participating agencies, consideration be given to utilizing existing and established agencies for this purpose. The Air Force number mentioned in particular the committee on medical services under the Air Force Research and Development Command.

13. Cdr. [redacted] briefed the group on our contacts with the [redacted] and [redacted] representatives in [redacted] and also our discussions with FDS in connection with this subject. In both cases, no indication of active participation in this matter either in CIA or the Department of Defense was given.

14. Possibility of re-approaching the FBI which so far has indicated no interest in this project was discussed. Names suggested which might be useful in this connection were provided (Mr. [redacted] and Mr. [redacted]). The former is probably the individual with the real knowledge while the latter is the FBI liaison officer with the services.