OPERATION PEDRO PAN: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF 14,000 CUBAN CHILDREN

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ABSTRACT

Operation Pedro Pan was a 1960s clandestine program resulting in the transport of more than 14,000 Cuban children to the United States. Based on the rumor that children would be taken from their parents if they remained in Cuba, Operation Pedro Pan serves as an example of U.S. government secrecy and propaganda. In this chapter, the authors examine the research efforts of former Pedro Pan children such as Maria de los Angeles Torres, and Yvonne M. Conde to uncover the stories of their transport to the United States, as well as relevant theories on government secrecy articulated by scholars such as Blanche Wiesen Cook and Carl J. Friedrich.

Keywords: Central Intelligence Agency; Cuba; government secrecy; Operation Pedro Pan.

While many Americans are familiar with such political exoduses of children as Kindertransport, through which 10,000 Jewish youth in Eastern Europe were sent to England during World War II, few have heard of the more recent, massive, and closer to home Operation Pedro Pan that took place...
from December 1960 to October 1962. The reasons why this tax-payer-funded plan to relocate Cuban children into the United States was – and to this day remains – largely clandestine are as intriguing and disturbing as the operation itself, and equally revealing of the culture of secrecy that lies beneath the surface of the ongoing Cold War against Cuba and withholding of documents from the period. That said, Operation Pedro Pan has “deep roots in the national security apparatuses of both governments” (Torres, p. 230).

As with most U.S.–Cuba policy of the past half century, Operation Pedro Pan came into being as a result of – and reaction to – Cuba’s change in political regime and perceived threat of communism. Yet, at the initiation of Operation Pedro Pan in 1960, Cuba had not yet declared itself communist. This would not happen for another year until the Bay of Pigs invasion when Cuba turned to the Soviet Union as an ally.¹

In 1960, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assisted by the anti-Castro movement, distributed a false document aimed at “disaffecting the middle class” (Torres, p. 136) stating that the Cuban government had passed a law permitting children to be taken from their parents and sent to communist indoctrination camps.² Anti-Castro leaders, according to Fabian Escalante (2004), would “coordinate” this parental rights or Patria Potestad law, and with the Catholic hierarchy the dissemination of a copy of a supposed Patria Potestad law, which they would themselves write, saying that the state was going to take away parents power over their children. The conspiring priests would then proceed to spread the lie from their pulpits, in such a way that the population, eminently religious, would challenge the revolution and thus create the internal conditions, which together with the physical elimination of Fidel, would produce the fall of the government. (p. 95)

Time (1961) magazine explained the alleged Patria Potestad law to an American audience:

The uproar started when the anti-Castro underground circulated copies of what it said was a new decree soon to come from the government. Under the decree, all children would remain with their parents “until they are three years old, after which they must be entrusted for physical and mental education to the Organization de Circulos Infantiles” – Castro’s network of state nurseries. Children from three to ten would live in government dormitories in their home provinces, would be permitted to visit their families “no less than two days per month.” But those older than ten would “be assigned … to the most appropriate place,” and thus might never come home.

Fearful for their children’s futures, “communist brainwashing” (Torres 2003, pp. 40–41), and having their children sent to the Soviet Union for “training” (Trussell, 1961),³ concerned parents of more than 14,000 youth willingly handed their children, ranging in age from 6 to 16 years, to the
U.S. government to airlift from the island. The parents – “separating from their children for the sake of saving them” (Torres, 2003, p. 239) – were told that once they packed their belongings and closed their lives in Cuba, the United States would help them emigrate and reunite with their children. But in 1962, at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States terminated all commercial flights to and from the island, leaving those parents who had not yet left Cuba stranded without their children.

Although this is how history played out on this occasion, declassified correspondence from the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library indicates the situation could have easily had another outcome. This communiqué reveals the U.S. government’s refusal of a proposal by the United Nations High Commission on Refugee Affairs to “negotiate the exit permits for the parents and siblings in Cuba,” as well as to pay for the Pedro Pan parents to fly to the United States to be reunited with their children (Torres, 2003, pp. 202–204). With this offer of assistance denied, the Catholic Church, which had helped relocate the Cuban children along with the U.S. State Department and CIA, collected them from Miami refugee camps where they had resided. The Church then disbursed the children among orphanages and to foster families throughout the United States.

By the time parents arrived in the United States from Cuba, which was often not for several years, many of their children had forgotten Spanish and could no longer communicate with them. Others couldn’t recognize their parents and even challenged their identities. Others still, were not reunited with their parents until they were adults with families of their own (Vidal de Haymes, 2004, p. 121). And far from the claim the U.S. government made of keeping the children safe in the United States, more than a few were molested by their foster families (Vieira, 2010) or clergy (Poynter Online, 2003).

The U.S. press released few stories on this massive exodus that linked church and state. According to Maria Vidal de Haymes, whose brothers were sent to the United States, Operation Pedro Pan was the largest organized political exodus of children in this hemisphere, yet the U.S. government kept the program so secretive that some of the participants in the program are just now finding out that they were among the Pedro Pan children. (p. 120)

Writing in her introduction to Operation Pedro Pan: The untold exodus of 14,048 Cuban children, Yvonne M. Conde (1999) notes that it was not until she was in her 40s that she learned of Operation Pedro Pan – and came to understand that her unaccompanied journey to the United States at age of
10 as an “evacuee” had been part of this program. Referring to children like Conde and her own brothers, Vidal de Haymes (2004) writes:

at best, these youth were used as political pawns in a cold war conflict, and, at worst, they were exploited in a CIA plot to disrupt and destabilize the new Cuban government by dislocating families and depriving the Castro government of the contributions of promising youth. (p. 121)

HAND IN HAND: SECRECY AND PROPAGANDA

Operation Peter Pan was also known as Operation Exodus, the “visa waiver program” (Torres v. Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), and the “unaccompanied children’s program.” The latter reference to the program especially served to camouflage the airlift as well as shield the numbers of Cuban children transitioned to the United States. For example, an April 29, 1961 memo with no identifying agency information titled “Revised Cuban Refugee Program” mentions Operation Pedro Pan in passing:

Care of unaccompanied children—This is a classified project involving 600 and 700 refugee children in foster homes and under group care.

But in 1961 before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapes (Part 1, p. 229), Senator Philip Hart (D-MI) quizzed a reticent Father Bryan O. Walsh, head of the Catholic Welfare Bureau relief efforts, who was reluctant to share information on the unaccompanied children’s program. The following exchange suggests Georg Simmel’s characterization of secrecy as “consciously willed concealment” (1906, p. 440):

Senator Hart: Now, how many unaccompanied children do you estimate have come here?

Reverend Walsh: The number of unaccompanied children that have come in? Let me say this first, if I may, on the unaccompanied children program. We have felt that publicity given to this program that would be interpreted as propaganda, by the Cuban regime, would render the continuance of this help difficult; in other words if the large deal of publicity was given to the program in the newspapers there, it might be interpreted wrongly as propaganda only and might lead to a shut off of exit permits for these children. So the newspapers and the radio and the press and various other news media have cooperated with us, and I am sure they will cooperate.

Senator Hart: I am sure the committee will.

Reverend Walsh: That is right; so the number that have come in to date – I have the figures here.
Senator Hart: If it is conceivable that this figure has been given the sort of treatment you have described up to now, there is no need to put it in the record.

Reverend Walsh: I shall be very glad to supply the committee with the figure.

Senator Hart: I would like to have it for our files only.

Reverend Walsh: The number of unaccompanied children that have come in through the auspices of our agency ...

Senator Hart: There is no need to put in the record as a figure. We shall receive for our files.

Reverend Walsh: Thank you. I shall give it to you. 

Remarkably, in the same hearings Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) and staff advisor Antonio A. Micocci openly shared details about the program with the Committee:

... 13,000 unaccompanied children have come to the United States... foster care for a little under 8,000 children has been financed by the Federal Government... about one-half of these 8,000 children have been reunited with their families. (Part 2, pp. 321–322)

In 1962, The New York Times framed the issue of Operation Pedro Pan secrecy in the following way:

Until recently, when its size gave it away, the activity was a carefully guarded secret... twice the flow of youngsters has been interrupted – once when a reporter wrote a dramatic story linking the migration to an underground. It ceased again temporarily after the Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961.

The same article stated that “authorities refuse to discuss the Cuban side of the operation” (The New York Times, 1962).

For the most part, Operation Pedro Pan was kept hush-hush. However, it is important to note the lack of transparency regarding Operation Pedro Pan was in part due to the very agencies that served to protect and relocate the children. When Cleveland Plain Dealer reporter Steven Van Beeler questioned the arrival of Cuban children to his neighborhood, the U.S. government referred him to Father Walsh who requested that Van Beeler “refrain from reporting on the matter, as any publicity about the program could bring recrimination to their parents in Cuba” (Torres, pp. 126, 150).

When the rare article ran, it was mainly promotional – and often contradictory in its efforts to cast Operation Pedro Pan in a positive light, as “a flight to freedom” (Torres, p. 250). In a Wisconsin State Journal article that ran a year after the start of Operation Pedro Pan, Associated Press
reporter Jean Sprain Wilson (1962) wrote the operation was considered “a carefully guarded secret lest Fidel Castro halt the youthful exodus.” Yet, a few paragraphs later, Wilson contradicted her claim that Castro was not aware of the transport of these children by writing:

[C]hildren in Cuba, the same as adults, must produce 25 American dollars somehow to buy an airplane ticket. Men who still do business with Havana say that apparently Castro would rather have the dollars than the kids.13

This characterization from the Wilson article was reproduced word for word in other newspapers around the country, especially in small town papers such as The Appleton Post Crescent (May 27, 1962), The Logansport Pharos-Tribune (May 27, 1962), and The Danville Register (May 29, 1962):

Authorities still refuse to discuss the Cuban side of the operation. But children in Cuba, the same as adults, must produce 25 American dollars somehow to buy an airplane ticket. Men who still do business with Havana say that apparently Castro would rather have the dollars than the kids.14

When information regarding the darker side of Operation Pedro Pan was leaked, Father Walsh gave the story a positive spin by offering press conferences on the humanitarian aspects of the undertaking. In this way, Operation Pedro Pan was temporarily transformed from a covert program to a propagandistic one in support of the U.S. government’s actions.15 This shift supports Carl J. Friedrich’s thesis that “propaganda is, like secrecy, a tampering of communications” (1972, p. 176). Propaganda also “steps in to manipulate by positive misinformation and thus swamp the channels” (Friedrich, 1972, p. 177). Certainly in the case of Operation Pedro Pan, secrecy, in its usage as a way to keep the public from knowing about something they may find distasteful, such as U.S. involvement in the Patria Potestad law or splitting up of families, could be considered to be a form of propaganda, if not a tactic for avoiding potential public debate and oversight. At such a point, secrecy becomes “dysfunctional” in a democracy “because the system depends for its functioning upon an adequately informed public opinion” (Friedrich, 1972, p. 177).

In the end it is a dangerous thing when the press conspires with the government to misinform the public, for as Howard Zinn writes of the Scientific Advisory Panel or the “military scientists” that recommended the atomic bombing of Hiroshima:

Equally important for social control as the military scientists are those professionals who are connected with the dissemination of knowledge in society: the teachers, the historians, the political scientists, the journalists, and yes, the archivists. (1977, p. 17)
Building the history of Operation Pedro Pan has been left to the “lost children” who have become historians and documentarians. Yvonne M. Conde, for example, in addition to conducting interviews with Pedro Pan children, submitted Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to the U.S. State Department, Immigration, and Naturalization Service and CIA to retrieve government documents on Operation Pedro Pan. Of note is Conde’s request to the CIA, which was denied by way of ambiguity:

...“not confirming nor denying” the existence of any related documents, denied me access based on state security. My subsequent appeal has been denied, and I was advised that legal action is the only course available. (1999, pp. xiii–xiv)

In researching her book *The lost apple: Operation Pedro Pan, Cuban children in the U.S., and the promise of a better future*, Pedro Pan child Maria de los Angeles Torres became involved in a complicated lawsuit against the CIA to access the files of her transport to the United States (pp. 233–239). Torres (2003, pp. 235–237) found through her litigation with the CIA that “cryptogram names for CIA operations are classified, making it impossible for a citizen to guess keywords on which to request a search.”

Although Torres (pp. 235–239) was unsuccessful in obtaining voluminous new agency information through her lawsuit, her experience illustrates the continuing problem of Cold War research and its relationship with government secrecy. Torres (2003) writes:

... because the operation was played out on the world stage of the Cold War, documents about this time period have been nearly impossible to obtain. Part of the U.S. government’s record of the operation was destroyed in a fire at a government warehouse in St. Louis. Other documents have not been released by the public because the operation was classified. Nor has the Catholic Welfare Bureau, a critical participant in the program, made its records public. They did donate the individual caseworkers report to Barry University in Florida, but these can only be accessed by the individual, not the public. (p. 229)

Reconstructing the unaccompanied children’s program is not only of human rights concern when considering “parents fighting in the underground trusted their children to the CIA” (Torres, p. 238), but of supreme importance to U.S. citizens in coming to terms with a tumultuous period in U.S.–Cuba relations vis-à-vis Cold War policy. Although the U.S. State Department was portrayed as the lead humanitarian agency in organizing the Pedro Pan airlift, particular details on the unaccompanied children’s
program are missing from the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series as the “official documentary historical record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity.” Lack of details on the program directly influence the integrity of the FRUS series as an ongoing means for U.S. citizens to understand Cold War events, and as such, challenge the trustworthiness of government information in reconstructing the complex web of actors, events, actions, and policies. Historian Blanche Wiesen Cook (1996) eloquently lays out the problem with “doing” Cold War research:

> The fact is that all of us who seek to do scholarship of any kind concerning the twentieth century are recovering cold warriors. Every word we read, every word we write is influenced and colored by one of the most relentlessly violent and repressive epochs in human history. We need a twelve-step program to detoxify the sources of our scholarship and to begin again to ramble freely along the road toward understanding and knowledge, toward judgments that are fair-minded and accurate, toward scholarship that is critical and alert, toward values and visions once considered civilized and humane. We have undergone a long detour, and we are stuck on a road that is littered with lies; the battlefield filth of twisted words, propaganda, and plausible presidential deniability. (p. 285)

In order to supplement personal narratives, oral histories, and the incomplete public record, as well as to answer significant questions, such as when the unaccompanied children’s program began, and for example, the policy reasons behind the children’s visa waiver program that existed alongside visa waiver programs for the Cuban population in general (Torres, p. 240), it is essential to construct a critical history of Operation Pedro Pan. What can only be thought of as a repair or resolve of the historical record is made possible through full disclosure and access to records residing in those agencies involved in the unaccompanied children’s program: Catholic Welfare Bureau, Jewish Family and Children’s Services, Children’s Service Bureau, International Rescue Committee, and state agency archives specifically in those areas of the United States that hosted Pedro Pan children (Torres, p. 149). The historical reconstruction of the unaccompanied children’s program would benefit from a public appeal for a Mandatory Declassification Review as well as for review and release of currently classified materials by the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, the CIA Historical Review Panel, presidential libraries, and the National Archives and Records Administration. FOIA litigation that perhaps results in an agency compilation of a Vaughn Index, and congressional review of the decennial review process for exempted CIA operational files would also serve in the release of
historical materials on the program. Supplementing these secret archives with existing open National Archives Record Groups that are mined for agencies that participated in Pedro Pan, such as the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of Defense, and United States Information Agency (USIA) would deepen understanding of the history, politics, and international dynamics of Operation Pedro Pan. Finally, though ambitious, perhaps a commission modeled on the 1981 Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC), which studied Japanese–American internment during World War II, might be created to investigate all aspects of the unaccompanied children’s program.

In the nearly 50 years since the conclusion of Operation Pedro Pan, many former Pedro Pan children have visited Cuba as adults. Disillusioned by the secrecy surrounding the circumstances of their arrival in the United States, many of these Cuban–Americans have returned to their adopted homeland to advocate for the end of another form of secrecy – the U.S. embargo against Cuba (Vieira, 2010). And if information about particular culture, people, and government is obscured in this way, then this could certainly be categorized as secrecy. But this, yet another angle of the lasting legacy of the Cold War, is fodder for another article altogether.

NOTES


2. See Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees. (1961), Cuban Refugee Problems, Part 1 and 2, for congressional inquiry into Cuban youth sent to the Former Soviet Union and its satellites.

3. Trussell also reports in this article that children were “used to elicit confessions from parents in Cuban jails.”

4. The U.S. Department of State was “responsible for refugee political policy matters, assisted by CIA in daily liaison. This is an area of major interest to Operation Mongoose, since the Cuban refugees have an open objective of overthrowing the Communist Regime in Havana ….,” (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Brig. Gen (Edward) Lansdale, “Review of Operation Mongoose,” July 25, 1962, declassified).

5. The New York Times (July 24, 1961) reported that the State Department “proposed 10 daily flights and reduced the fee to 17.50.”
6. There are several accounts of how the unaccompanied children’s program received its public name: from George Miller in a March 9, 1962 Miami Herald article; named by Father Walsh for the first child under his care, Pedro Menéndez; and for the character in the play Peter Pan. See Ruiz and Korrol (2006). Also see Torres (p. 66).

7. The National Catholic Welfare Council processed 92 percent of children in the unaccompanied children’s program; see testimony of Hon. Dante B. Fascell, 4th congressional district (United States, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees (1961), Cuban refugee problems, Part 1, p. 229.)

8. Throughout the hearings, “Operation Pedro Pan” was never mentioned, but consistently referred to as the “unaccompanied children’s program.”

9. According to Torres (p. 78), the Kennedy administration placed DHEW in charge of the “overt” Cuban refugee programs “including to protect unaccompanied children,” but the visa waiver program for minors and transportation of Cuban children would remain classified.

10. This same article reports that “Catholic aide” George Guasch, who greeted the unaccompanied children when they arrived in Florida, was “a tall dour Cuban American,” who “smashed news photographers’ cameras.”

11. According to Torres, agencies such as the Children’s Bureau and in general, “administrators and organizers repeatedly asked Congress and the press not to scrutinize the program” (pp. 151–152).


13. See Torres (p. 58). Cubans who wished to expatriate not only had to have a military exit permit and housing inventory in hand along with a U.S. visa, but also airline tickets had to be “purchased in American dollars.”

14. See The New York Times (“US say that airlift will cut Cuban refugee backlog despite curb,” July 24, 1961) reported the State Department proposed 10 daily flights as well as a reduction in the fee to $17.50.

15. Radio Swan, named for Swan Island in the Honduras, worked with the United States Information Service (USIA) and the State Department “to create and distribute a daily bulletin of unattributed material about Cuba” Cull (2010, p. 158). A declassified USIA memo to Brig. Gen Lansdale outlines various Cuban radio stations in addition to identifying Radio Swan as “Radio Americas” a “covert medium wave” broadcast operating 10.5 hours per day, seven days per week as originating from Swan Island. Programs were “written and taped by Cuban exiles under Agency supervision and control” (September 11, 1962, Digital National Security Archive). There was concern raised in an August 8, 1962 declassified “Memorandum to the Special Group (Augmented)” from Brig. Gen. Edward Lansdale over the international legality of broadcasts, which “could bring serious reprisals” (p. 3, Digital National Security Archive).

17. See Exemption 1, which “protects from disclosure information that has been deemed classified. Under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy’ and is ‘in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order.’” United States Department of Justice Guide to the Freedom of Information Act, available at: www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/exemption1.pdf

18. The lost apple is also the title of a CIA-USIA film on Cuban refugee children, of which Brig. Gen. Lansdale remarked “we should exploit the emotional possibilities of the 8,000 children that were under the protection of the United States” (Torres, 2003, p. 179–182).


20. Maria de los Angeles Torres in her complaint Torres v. Central Intelligence Agency (39F. Supp. 2d 960; 1999). Torres writes that “unfortunately, the issue in court was a narrow one: whether the CIA had conducted an adequate search for my request” (p. 235). Torres reports the FOIA officer (Lee Strickland) searched the phrase “Pedro Pan” in a CIA database called Orris, which “contains previously released documents. The CIA knew “Pedro Pan” was not a cryptogram for any of their operations, something I could not have known because the list of cryptogram names is confidential” (note 16, p. 310).

21. R. Hart Phillips (1961) characterized members of the underground as “angry and disillusioned young men and women who were once ardent supporters of Fidel Castro. In fact many of them served in the Castro underground during his two-year revolt against the Batista regime.” See New York Times.


23. A search of FRUS revealed no mention of Operation Pedro Pan or the “exodus.” Missing information in FRUS suggests historian Blanche Wiesen Cook’s (1996, pp. 285–292) comment “do we publish a human rights retrospective volume at FRUS or forget about it?”

24. Torres (p. 239) writes of Pedro Pan: the “order of how events unfolded is not clear; there are several version versions of the chronology.” This, along with issues such as when precisely Pedro Pan began, the military origins of the program (Torres, p. 242), and why a separate visa waiver program for children was instituted by the U.S. are questions that remain regarding the unresolved history of the unaccompanied children’s program. Torres (p. 240) hypothesizes the program might have been “a well-concerted ploy to train a group of Cuban children as future democratic leaders of Cuba?”

25. See Torres, especially chapters 2 and 3.

26. Permits individuals or agencies to require an agency to review specific classified national security information for purposes of seeking its declassification, which includes an appeal to the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP); see The Keys for Seeking Declassification of Government Documents Protected by E.O. 12958, As Amended, available at www.archives.gov/isoo/speeches-and-articles/keys-for-declassification.html

27. A Vaughn “decision requires agencies to prepare an itemized index, correlating each withheld document (or portion) with a specific FOIA exemption and the relevant part of the agency’s nondisclosure justification. Such an index allows the trial court ‘to make a rational decision [about] whether the withheld
material must be produced without actually viewing the documents themselves ... [and] to produce a record that will render [its] decision capable of meaningful review on appeal.’ It also helps to ‘create balance between the parties.’ If a court finds that an index is not sufficiently detailed, it should require one that is more detailed. Alternatively, if a Vaughn Index is inadequate to support withholding, it may be supplemented by in camera review of the withheld material.” See the U.S. Department of Justice, *Freedom of Information Act Guide*, 2004, available at [www.usdoj.gov/oip/litigation.htm](http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/litigation.htm).


29. See USIA records at the National Archives are assigned to Record Group 306, available at [www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/306.html](http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/306.html).

30. Thanks to Steve Aftergood for this suggestion; see the National Archives and Records Administration for records of the CWRIC, available at [http://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/hearings.html](http://www.archives.gov/research/japanese-americans/hearings.html).

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